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Abstract. Pakistan recently conducted small-scale trials of a remote
Internet voting system for overseas citizens. In this contribution, we re-
port on the experience: we document the unique combination of socio-
political, legal, and institutional factors motivating this exercise. We de-
scribe the system and it’s reported vulnerabilities, and we also highlight
new issues pertaining to materiality. If this system is deployed in the
next general elections —as seems likely —this development would con-
stitute the largest enfranchised diaspora in the world. Our goal in this
paper, therefore, is to provide comprehensive insight into Pakistan’s ex-
periment with Internet voting, emphasize outstanding challenges, and
identify directions for future research.
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1 Introduction
Pakistan recently piloted a remote Internet voting system for overseas citizens.
This system, i-Voting3, was indigenously developed and originally scheduled for
full-scale deployment in the General Elections of July, 2018. However, these
plans were deferred after a third-party technical audit of the system uncovered
numerous vulnerabilities and security concerns. i-Voting was deployed shortly
after on a trial basis: in bye-elections, first in October, 2018, spanning 35 con-
stituencies, and next in December, 2018 in 1 constituency. Some 7,538 votes were
cast (7,461 in October and 77 in December) using this system and these were
declared binding and incorporated into the final results.
It is widely expected that this pilot is a prelude to full-scale deployment
in the General Elections of 2023.4 Since Pakistan currently has over 8 million
overseas citizens [1], this may well be the largest deployment of Internet voting
in the world. It is therefore essential to document and study this experiment.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
3 also referred to as iVoting, iVOTE, IVoting
4 Currently, the law restricts use of such systems to bye-elections.
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1. We report on the deployment: we document the public debate on Internet
voting and the legislative and political process to facilitate it. We describe
the i-Voting system and we report on the pilot exercise.
2. We describe the various risks involved in this modality of voting and sum-
marize key findings of the technical audit. We examine the materiality, and
therefore the potential political significance of overseas voting.
3. We highlight the unorthodox combination of unique political and social fac-
tors in Pakistan that have resulted in this exercise and we discuss various
particular challenges that may arise as a result.
This paper holds relevance for election stakeholders including governments,
political parties, election administrators, political scientists, researchers, and
technologists. Pakistan’s Internet voting experience may also prove instructive
for other countries, particularly in the developing world, where governments are
severely limited in terms of financial resources, technical expertise, and infras-
tructure to undertake such critical large-scale projects.
2 Background
Organization of Government Pakistan has a parliamentary form of govern-
ment with bicameral legislature, comprising a Senate (upper house) with 104
members and a National Assembly (lower house) with 342 members. Each of
the four large provinces have a unicameral legislature, consisting of a Provincial
Assembly.5 The electoral system is the first-past-the-post system under universal
adult suffrage. Members of the National Assembly and Provincial Assembly are
elected by representation in electoral districts (referred to as seats or constituen-
cies). The number of seats in each administrative division is listed in Table 2.
General elections are conducted every five years and are overseen by the Election
Commission of Pakistan (ECP), which is an independent and autonomous body
as defined in the Constitution of Pakistan.
Body Total Federal Baluch- Federally Khyber Punjab Sindh
Seats Capital -istan Administered Pakhtun-
Islamabad Tribal Areas -khwa
National 272 3 16 12 39 141 61
Assembly
Provincial 577 - 51 - 99 297 130
Assembly
Table 1. National and Provincial Assembly Seats [2]
Overseas Pakistanis and the Right to Vote Pakistan, has over 8 million
overseas citizens [1] which comprises the sixth largest diaspora in the world
[3]. Overseas citizens are actively engaged in the socioeconomic well-being of
the country and every year send home remittances worth approximately US$19
billion, which accounts for around 5% of Pakistan’s GDP [4].
5 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Federal Capital Islamabad are
administrative divisions in addition to the four provinces, included in the contested
elections and comprise National Assembly seats only.
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Article 17 of the Constitution of Pakistan grants all adult citizens the fun-
damental right to vote [5]. This article has generally been interpreted to ac-
knowledge that this right extends to all Pakistani citizens, irrespective of place
of residence. Overseas Pakistanis have raised calls for enfranchisement and facil-
itation of their voting rights since the first general elections of 1970 [6].
The earliest constitutional petition filed to facilitate overseas voters was in
1993 by a British-Pakistani student and the Supreme Court of Pakistan referred
it to the government and the ECP for consideration [7]. After a hiatus of almost
two decades, more petitions followed in quick succession: in 2011, Dr. Arif Alvi,
Secretary General of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), a popular political party
petitioned the Supreme court in this regard; in 2014, the Islamabad High Court
was likewise petitioned by a concerned overseas citizen, and in June 2015, by
the Chairman of PTI, Mr. Imran Khan.
The judiciary, while addressing this grievance, has upheld this fundamental
right of overseas citizens on multiple occasions [8] [9] [10], ruling that this right
cannot be denied on technical grounds, and it has repeatedly directed the ECP
to make the necessary logistical arrangements. We discuss these attempts next.
Efforts by the Election Commission and Parliament In 2012, in one of
the earliest statements on the subject, the ECP dismissed the possibility of over-
seas citizens’ participation in the General Elections of 2013, citing logistics and
budgeting issues [11]. However, by 2015, the ECP had established a Directorate
for Overseas Voting in its Secretariat, which conducted mock overseas voting
exercises using postal ballots and voting via telephone [12].
These trials were unsuccessful. The reasons were clarified in a study com-
missioned by the ECP: “We find that any remote voting solution using cur-
rently available technology whether postal, internet, telephone, or proxy will
lack the necessary electoral integrity checks to preserve the credibility of an elec-
tion result.” Commenting on the feasibility of other modalities, the report stated:
“...given the size and dispersal of the Pakistani diaspora, coupled with the lim-
ited official resources available in-country and abroad, any significant in-person
voting operation would be expensive and logistically challenging” [13].
In July of 2014, the Parliamentary Committee for Electoral Reforms was
constituted with Finance Minister Ishaq Dar as chair. A sub-committee was
formed in January, 2016 by MP Dr. Arif Alvi (one of the petitioners for overseas
voting mentioned earlier and Secretary General of PTI) to devise a mechanism
for overseas voting [14] and in March, 2017, it proposed remote Internet voting as
a potential solution. Consequently, the committee authored the Elections Act of
2017, which authorized the ECP “to conduct pilot projects for voting by Overseas
Pakistanis in bye-elections” [7].
The ECP subsequently requested the National Database Registration Au-
thority (NADRA) to build a system. NADRA is an independent and autonomous
agency working under the Ministry of Interior and tasked with managing gov-
ernment databases and issuing national identity cards to citizens. However the
system did not materialize: in June 2017, ECP again contacted NADRA, but
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NADRA expressed its regrets at not having a solution available [12].
The Supreme Court Intervenes Interest in overseas voting peaked again in
the six months leading up to the General Elections of July, 2018. The Supreme
Court of Pakistan consolidated 16 similar constitutional petitions and resumed
hearings on the issue [15]. It sought reports from the ECP and NADRA over
non-compliance of Section 94 of the Elections Act (regarding pilot projects for
overseas voters) [16]. In an attempt to break the deadlock, the Supreme court
directed NADRA to develop an Internet voting system. NADRA informed the
court that it would require 4 months to build a system and would cost Rs.150 mil-
lion (approximately US$ 1.36 million) [17]. However, the Court ordered NADRA
to present it in 10 weeks [18].
The new system, i-Voting, was unveiled on April 12, 2018 at a public session
convened by the Supreme Court [19]. The audience included members of various
political parties, IT experts from Pakistani universities, concerned citizens, and
members of the media. It was here that IT experts aired serious security concerns
regarding this system and pointed out that similar systems had been demonstra-
bly attacked and were being phased out in developed countries. The Supreme
Court concluded the session by forming an Internet Voting Task Force (IVTF)
to audit the system and assess its suitability for deployment in the forthcoming
general elections of July, 2018.
3 The i-Voting System
Here we describe NADRA’s i-Voting system and summarize the IVTF findings.
System Architecture The i-Voting system conforms to the traditional design
of Internet voting solutions, where a centralized database is used to store and
tabulate votes, which voters access using a Web portal.
More specifically, as depicted in Fig. 1, a central datacenter hosts the overseas
votes database and an application and email Server. These servers interface with
a webserver hosting the i-Voting Web portal (Fig. 2) and NADRA databases (for
verification of voter information). The ECP can monitor the system using an
administrative portal. Load balancing and backup arrangements are deployed
as well as standard security solutions including firewalls, intrusion detection
mechanisms, and mitigation of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
Voter Registration The registration process is depicted in Fig. 3 [20]. To enrol,
a user must possess his/her passport, a National Identity Card for Overseas
Pakistanis (NICOP), and a valid e-mail address. The ECP announces a public
Registration Phase during which prospective voters enter their basic details into
the system. A confirmation email with a PIN is then sent to the voter. To confirm
the account, the user enters the PIN and solves a CAPTCHA.
Now the user logs in to the system and provides further details of his NICOP
and passport. He also answers two randomly chosen questions pertaining to his
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identity after which he is successfully registered. The system allows a maximum
of 3 answer attempts, failing which the NICOP number is restricted.
Vote Casting and Preparation of Results Prior to polling day, each regis-
tered voter is emailed containing a unique passcode (which acts as a one-time
password), enabling him to log on to his i-Voting account and cast a vote for his
respective National Assembly and/or Provincial Assembly seat (Fig. 3).
When polling concludes, the ECP tabulates the votes via the Reporting Por-
tal and dispatches the tally to concerned officials for consolidation of results.
Internet Voting Task Force The Internet Voting Task Force (IVTF) was
given a time window of 3 weeks to assess the security of the i-Voting system.
The team comprised of IT and security specialists and academic researchers [21].
They conducted a high level security analysis of the system, examined the code,
and mounted some typical attacks. The results were written up in a report and
submitted to the Supreme Court. Their key findings are as follows:
1. i-Voting does not provide ballot secrecy, a fundamental right defined in the
Constitution of Pakistan. This further opens up the possibility of vote buying
and coercion of overseas voters.
2. A key security vulnerability allowed overseas voters to bypass their native
constituencies and cast votes for any two seats of their choice in the country.
3. The IVTF successfully launched impersonation attacks, enabling them to
send fake emails purportedly from the ECP to direct voters to fake websites.
4. i-Voting avails the services of a leading DDoS mitigation solution, a measure
which researchers have recently demonstrated can potentially compromise
ballot secrecy and election integrity [22].
5. The system employs certain third-party security components (such as text-
based CAPTCHAs) which are obsolete and demonstrably insecure.
The IVTF also raised other critical non-security concerns: i-Voting lacked
verifiability, fail-safe, or redundancy mechanisms. There were no security poli-
cies or procedural controls defined to protect critical security processes from
insider attacks. No usability studies or trials had been conducted for the system.
Futhermore, the system was built in an ad-hoc manner with key documentation
missing. For instance, there was no documented Solution Requirements Speci-
fication (SRS) or documentation pertaining to key operational processes (such
as administration, hosting, responsibility of critical components), which limited
assessment for certain important security attacks.
Fig. 1. i-Voting: System Architecture
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Fig. 2. iVoting: Interface
The IVTF therefore strongly argued against the deployment of i-Voting in
the upcoming General Elections of 2018. Their report stated that this would be
“a hasty step with grave consequences” The report also emphasized that “many
of these security vulnerabilities are not specific to iVOTE [sic] but are inherent
to this particular model of Internet voting systems” [23].
The report also made various recommendations to facilitate overseas voters.
We discuss these in Sec. 6 and 7.
4 Deployment
The Supreme Court of Pakistan revisited the matter of Internet voting after the
general elections in August, 2018, and ruled: “Based on these representations
we prima facie find the mechanism of I-Voting (sic) to be safe, reliable and
effective for being utilized in a pilot project. We are sanguine that the aforesaid
proposed rules shall be incorporated in the Election Rules, 2017 to enable overseas
Pakistanis to exercise their right of vote in the forthcoming bye-elections.” The
court further stipulated that votes cast using i-Voting not be added to the final
tally until the ECP is satisfied with regards to their “technical efficacy, secrecy,
and security”. In case of any dispute the ECP was authorized to exclude these
overseas votes from the official results [10].
Fig. 3. Voter Registration
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Fig. 4. Vote Casting
The ECP consequently amended the Election Rules to accommodate the
requirements of Internet voting. NADRA implemented certain technical recom-
mendations of the IVTF6 and trained ECP officials to administer the system.
The ECP launched a media campaign for voter awareness and published detailed
guides and video tutorials for the i-Voting system. A dedicated support center
was also set up to provide telephone and email assistance [12].
First Pilot (Bye-Elections - 14 October, 2018) Bye-elections were held
for 35 constituencies (11 National Assembly and 24 Provincial Assembly seats).
The total overseas Pakistanis eligible to participate in these polls numbered a
significant 631,909. However, out of these only 7,419 citizens (1.17%) actually
registered to vote using the new system. On the day of the elections, a total of
6,146 voters of these citizens cast their votes [12].
ECP later reported that on the day of the polls the system successfully
withstood 7,476 DDoS attempts.7 The top 5 countries by voter count were the
United Arab Emirates (1,654), Saudi Arabia (1,451), the United Kingdom (752),
Canada (328), and the United States (298). The pilot project cost approximately
Rs. 95 million (0.67 million USD approximately) [12].
The trial was smooth and uneventful. In its own report, the ECP attributed
the low turnout to the short time frame within which the system was deployed
and advertised. The ECP also cited key issues which echoed the concerns of the
Internet Voting Task Force (discussed in Sec. 3), in that the system violates
ballot secrecy, enables voter coercion, lacks auditability, and may be vulnerable
to state-level cyberattacks.
Second Pilot (Bye-Elections - 13 December, 2018) As many as 4,667
overseas Pakistanis from more than ten countries were eligible to vote for one
Provincial Assembly seat [24]. However, only 77 overseas Pakistanis registered
to vote. The ECP has not released any further details about this trial [25].
5 Materiality - Are Overseas Votes Decisive?
In this section we undertake a basic post-election analysis to examine the po-
tential impact of overseas votes on final results.
6 No details have been published on what specific changes were made.
7 No details of these attacks have been released to the public.
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The leading Pakistani citizen observation group, Free and Fair Election Net-
work (FAFEN) has conducted an analysis of 2018 General Election results [26]
and has determined that, in a significant number of constituencies, the Margin
of Victory (MoV) is less than the number of invalid votes. A similar analysis, but
comparing Margin of Victory with number of Eligible Overseas Voters would be
useful to highlight the materiality8. There is no publicly available voter regis-
tration or population data which shows how many registered voters are actually
Overseas Pakistanis for all constituencies. The only exception to this is for the
constituencies where by elections were conducted using i-Voting in October and
December 2018. The average percentage of eligible overseas voters, as a per-
centage of total voters in the October 2018 By-elections is 6.88% ( Table 2).
With this assumption, we estimate the number for eligible overseas voters for
individual constituencies under scrutiny.
We then calculate an estimated Overseas Pakistani Voters value for each
contested constituency in the October 2018 By elections that was also contested
in the July 2018 General Elections. We now compare these Estimated Overseas
Voters (EOV) value with the margin of victory and flag where the MoV is less.
We do this both for the October 2018 By-elections and the July 2018 General
Elections. We may describe the number of Overseas Pakistani Voters in these
cases as material to the outcome of the election9.
As Table 3 shows, in ten of twenty-seven by-election races, Overseas Pakistani
Voters had the potential to be material. This grows to thirteen of twenty-seven
for General Election races. In five races, both Bye-Election and General Election
saw Margin of Victory less than estimated Overseas Pakistani Voters. It is, we
believe, reasonable to assume that, in competitive future General Elections at
least one in five races may be decided by votes cast by overseas Pakistani voters.
This places the integrity of and trust in any internet voting solutions deployed
by the Elections Commission of Pakistan into very sharp focus. This is positive
in the sense that overseas Pakistanis can feel their votes count. At the same time
it necessitates election integrity checks so that this right is not misused.
6 Discussion
In this section we further examine outstanding issues arising from this experi-
ment and we attempt to contextualize these by examining the unique political
and institutional factors that motivated these pilot projects.
8 Materiality in this context refers to the theoretical scenario where all possible over-
seas votes are cast, and all are cast for the second place or losing candidate, the
outcome of the election might have been different/might be different.
9 The public domain sources for Table 2 and 3 are no longer available on ECP Website.
The documents will be made available at a URL which will be cited later (to retain
anonymity).
Pakistan’s Internet Voting Experiment 9
Description Number
Total Registered Voters in bye-election 9,185,705 []
Total Eligible NICOP 734,777 []
Non-Machine Readable Passports ( 14%) 102,868 []
Estimated Total Overseas Pakistani Voters 631,909 []
Eligible Overseas Pakistani Voters as % of Voters Registered 6.88% []
Table 2. Calculating Estimated Percentage of Overseas Pakistani Voters
Fig. 5. Twitter users Posting Screenshot of Vote
6.1 Ballot Secrecy and Voter Coercion
In delivering one right (the right of overseas Pakistanis to vote), the solution risks
undermining another (the right to secrecy). The i-Voting system does not comply
with Article 226 of the Constitution of Pakistan [27] and the Elections Act 2017,
Section 8110 [28], that impose ballot secrecy. Being a remote voting modality,
there is no mechanism to prevent an individual from revealing their vote to
others. Similarly, certain event logging software (specially on a shared/public
device) can secretly capture the choice of a voter.
Electoral offences were committed by voters unintentionally, by posting screen
shots on social media, as shown in Fig 5. The tweeters seem to be unaware their
actions are electoral offences, and being outside the jurisdiction of Pakistan it is
unclear, how such offenders can be brought to justice11.
In addition, to the lack of secrecy for the voter at the client end, the low levels
of participation in pilots also mean that, in some cases, typically PA seats (PB-
35, PP-165, PP-292 from October 2018 bye-elections [12]), the voter’s choice is
revealed. The usual solution to this problem (mixing votes from multiple ballot
10 The exceptions in Section 81 are not to the secrecy requirement, rather to require-
ment of casting a vote by inserting paper ballot into a ballot box.
11 Section 178 of the Elections Act 2017 elaborates the offences relating to ballot se-
crecy.
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Constit Total Estimated General Elections Bye Elections Both
uency Registered Overseas July,2018 October,2018 Elections
Voters Voters (EOV) MoV MoV <EOV MoV MoV <EOV Mov <EOV
PB-40 76,173 5,240 13,345 - 9,141 - -
NA-53 313,141 21,541 48,763 - 18,630 - -
NA-35 582,785 40,091 7,001 Yes 23,455 - -
PK-3 146,180 10,056 5,550 Yes 1,163 - -
PK-7 155,719 10,712 5,825 Yes 334 - -
PK-44 202,601 13,937 10,857 Yes 1,630 - -
PK-53 153,352 10,549 6,729 Yes 61 - -
PK-61 139,517 9,597 4,593 Yes 5,247 - -
PK-64 160,728 11,056 18,579 - 13,215 - -
PK-97 155,032 10,665 16,461 - 10,172 - -
NA-56 640,133 44,036 64,490 - 41,593 Yes -
NA-63 371,713 25,571 35,979 - 26,292 - -
NA-65 553,289 38,062 51,963 - 68,591 - -
NA-69 469,177 32,275 73,172 - 50,803 - -
NA-124 535,172 36,815 65,287 - 47,533 - -
NA-131 365,677 25,155 756 Yes 10,031 Yes Yes
PP-3 224,755 15,461 37,008 - 227 Yes -
PP-27 312,370 21,488 1,766 Yes 656 Yes Yes
PP-118 222,190 15,285 548 Yes 5,189 Yes Yes
PP-164 137,906 9,486 20,870 - 7,561 Yes -
PP-165 132,077 9,085 20,372 - 5,742 Yes -
PP-201 232,120 15,968 17,297 - 7,024 Yes -
PP-222 196,858 13,542 11,446 Yes 6,083 Yes Yes
PP-261 187,510 12,899 9,371 Yes 14,261 - -
PP-272 167,467 11,520 5,390 Yes 8,899 Yes Yes
PP-292 141,297 9,720 253 Yes 10,692 - -
NA-243 402,731 27,704 67,291 - 21,601 - -
Table 3. Materiality of Overseas Voters in Selected Constituencies, General and Bye-
Elections 2018
boxes or polling stations) is not available in the i-Voting context or could only
be implemented at the cost of further erosion of already minimal transparency.
As the IVTF report points out, some jurisdictions [29] allow a voter to waive
their right to secrecy. This is not a solution to the problem, as any voter (or
party or candidate) to assert their constitutional and legal rights to secrecy for
the system to be challenged.
Almost half of the diaspora, over 4 million Pakistanis reside in the Middle
East, and about a quarter (over 1.5 million) reside in Europe [30]. A bulk of the
diaspora specifically in the Middle East are labourers. The ECP itself recognizes
the risk of vote buying and coercion when it speaks of the ”kafeel”12 abusing
custody of passports [12]. The ILO13 describes this system as placing migrant
workers in ”a position of vulnerability and have very little leverage to negotiate
with employers, given the significant power imbalance embedded within the em-
12 Sponsor for a migrant worker
13 International Labour Organization
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ployment relationship. Common grievances expressed by migrant workers include
restrictions on free movement, confiscation of passports, delayed or non-payment
of salaries, long working hours, untreated medical needs, and violence all condi-
tions that can give rise to situations of forced labour and human trafficking” [31].
It is reasonable to assume that anyone who will treat migrant workers in this
manner will not hesitate to exploit their votes for political or financial benefit.
Migrant workers are bound to face difficulty to independently use the i-Voting
System. This could pave the way for coercion, vote buying and compromise
secrecy if vote casting is aided by a computer literate party. Thus, usability tests
need to be conducted to receive direct input from real users. It might be argued
that low usability, was a primary reason of the low registration turnout, where
only 1.17 % [12] of the total eligible overseas voters successfully registered with
the i-Voting system. Further, there seem to be no special accessibility features
incorporated to address the needs of voters with disabilities.
6.2 Voter Authentication
The process of registration on the i-Voting platform [32] is entirely out of ECP’s
control, relying as it does on a verification method conducted and adjudicated
by a computer programme. Potential overseas voters are quizzed with questions,
whose answers are considered ”secret”. Common sense dictates that, despite the
familial/personal nature of these questions, the answers will not be known ex-
clusively to the voter. As a consequence, ECP cannot guarantee that the voter
registered via the online platform [32] is indeed the eligible citizen, or an impos-
tor. Other key mechanisms to protect the integrity of the electoral rolls - the
public display of and claims/objections on the draft electoral rolls - are omitted
from the online process. Political parties, observers, and voters themselves, are
not given the access to these electoral rolls to allow for the scrutiny that would
contribute to stakeholder confidence in the electoral rolls.
Furthermore, the mechanism within i-Voting to “lock” an identity following
repeated incorrect answers or CAPTCHA verification may be used for voter
suppression - a sort of denial-of-service attack, albeit on a vote-by-vote basis.
Voters may not know the answers to all the questions they might be asked
(where, for example, an 18 year old was registered and a parent provided the
information). Corrupt or partisan Presiding Officers could merely strike out the
names of legitimate voters saying that they had registered online for i-Voting.
6.3 Election Integrity and Dispute Resolution
On election day in polling stations across Pakistan, a long list of integrity mech-
anisms are in place, arising from the Constitution, the Elections Act 2017 and
the Election Rules 2017, as amended14. In the i-Voting system these fourteen
14 The election is conducted in full view of polling staff, party/candidate agents and
observers, who first-hand witness the integrity checks in place: verify ballot boxes
are initially empty, identify voters on arrival, ink their fingers (to prevent multiple
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separate mechanisms are missing with consequences for electoral integrity. The
exclusion of party/candidate agents and citizen observers from the i-Voting pro-
cess is compounded by the inherent absence of any verifiability mechanism or
possibility to audit the i-Voting system - by design -”In order to ensure that
Voting is kept secret, all data was encrypted and no audit trail of voting was
kept by the system” [12].
ECP may exclude based on its ”opinion” as to whether the ”technical efficacy,
secrecy and security of the voting has not been maintained” [12]. It is not known
how ECP informs that opinion, or whether it has the required access to the i-
Voting system. Given the 2018 recourse to establishing the IVTF, it seems likely
that ECP lacks the technical capacity to properly arrive at an informed opinion.
Given the likely materiality of votes cast by overseas Pakistanis in a significant
proportion of contests, we may expect many electoral disputes to centre around
the integrity of i-Voting system.
Specifically, in a developing country like Pakistan, where the democratic pro-
cess is at an inflection point, and the mechanisms to investigate and resolve elec-
toral disputes, are still very fragile, electoral improprieties or even the impression
of such can potentially lead to political deadlock and turmoil. An indication of
this is the PILDAT (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Trans-
parency) report on the perception of pre-poll fairness which notes that ”the
internet-based OP voting may also be a major instrument of rigging in 2018
General Election” [33]. Diverse stakeholders including the ECP itself [12], and
prominent mainstream political parties expressed similar reservations [34] [35].
Lack of auditability features means there is no evidence if results are challenged
through an election petition. These, coupled with questions over the capacity
and willingness of the judiciary, raises concerns about the resolution of electoral
disputes around internet voting.
6.4 Threat Model
Concerns have also been raised regarding the threat model on which i-Voting is
based. The recent controversy of foreign interference in US elections hints that a
developing country like Pakistan may also be at risk. ECP’s report on the pilot
deployment highlights this concern: “[adversaries] did not materially interfere
merely to put us off track. When the system is finalized and put into practice in
the next elections, shall we be able to counter/control cyber attacks[?]” [12].
Furthermore, whereas the high number of DDoS attacks (around 7476 on bye-
elections day), posed an outage threat, the use of a DDoS mitigation service, as
demonstrated recently by Culnane et al. [22], introduces a new attack vector.
The mitigation service is in a position to decrypt incoming traffic, thereby able
to compromise ballot secrecy and potentially even alter the content. The IVTF
voting), vote casting in secrecy behind a screen, placing the ballot paper into the
transparent ballot box, the Presiding officer conducting the count and disseminating
the results form to all stakeholders, and packaging all ballot papers (valid, invalid,
challenged, spoiled) separately in tamper-evident envelopes.
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audit highlighted this concern in their report and pointed out that the servers
employed by the DDoS mitigation service were all based overseas and beyond
control of Pakistani authorities.
6.5 The Curious Case of Pakistan
We see the Supreme Court at the forefront, driving the institutions to deliver a
voting solution to overseas Pakistanis. Here we try to make sense of the unique
predicament and examine the various factors that led to this situation. The
judiciary has time and again reiterated the ECP to roll out a voting mechanism
for overseas Pakistanis, but to no avail. A concrete step in this direction was
long overdue and it had to take the Supreme Court to push it through, given
the institutional inertia within the government.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan frequently takes Government ministries and
other public bodies to task for not fulfilling their obligations [36]. Whether
through judicial activism (using suo moto powers) or responding to petitions
from interested parties, it often gets involved in the technical specifics of cases.
Its jurisdiction “is not limited to mere procedural technicalities as it enjoys cer-
tain inherent powers to do complete justice in any case” [37]. A vivid example of
the Supreme Court’s ambition beyond procedural technicalities is the fund es-
tablished in July 2018 to raise money to build dams. This fund currently exceeds
ten billion Pakistani rupees (approximately 71 million US $) [38].
Cognizant of this deviation, the Honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan, in-
quired whether it was the job of the Supreme Court to give the right to vote
to overseas Pakistanis? [16] In the matter of how best to enfranchise overseas
Pakistanis the Supreme Court initially directed the elections management body
to develop an internet voting system and then later mandated the use of this
system in binding political bye-elections. In doing so, the Supreme Court dis-
missed unambiguous and dire warnings from the IVTF about the hazards of
the proposed system as mere ”technical and security apprehensions”, and that
the report was ”generally positive and encouraging” [10]. While the IVTF re-
port clearly says ”Hopefully, this discussion thus far demonstrates to the reader
why internet voting is recognized by security experts to be a controversial and
risky undertaking”, and it concludes by asserting ”We would, therefore, urge all
stakeholders to exercise extreme caution in approaching the question of internet
voting” [23]. This disconnect has received media recognition [39].
The ECP itself was very reluctant to adopt this modality of overseas voting.
Recently, when the matter was taken up in the Senate, in May 2019, Senator
Javed Abbasi recollected that ”the ECP had convinced political parties that the
system should not be introduced in Pakistan, but could not convince the Supreme
Court”, at which an ECP representative expressed his dismay that while the
ECP tried to dissuade the Supreme Court, no political party supported the
ECP in Supreme Court [40]. The absence of a broad political consensus on the
use of i-Voting to enfranchise the diaspora does not bode well for the future.
Neither the Elections Commission of Pakistan, nor the developers of the i-
Voting system challenged the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the IVTF find-
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ings or recommendations. Since there is no higher court than the Supreme Court,
no appeal is possible. If a future election is decided on votes cast by overseas
Pakistanis, via the i-Voting system, and the result is challenged —which seems
highly likely, given both the deficiencies and materiality described earlier in this
paper —it will be interesting to see if the electoral dispute resolution process
ends up in the same court.
7 Way Forward and Conclusion
Pakistan’s experiment for the October 2018 by elections was the largest de-
ployment of Internet voting in a binding election, anywhere in the world. The
recommendations of both the IVTF report, and ECP’s own report on the Octo-
ber 2018 pilot exercise are comprehensive and we endorse these. Going beyond
these, and comparing the Pakistani experience with other countries who are fur-
ther along the internet voting pathway, we would highlight two vital priorities.
First, transparency: ECP and NADRA succeeded in delivering a working pro-
totype system in the short time available, but the details of the process were,
and remain, opaque. Stakeholder acceptance cannot be assured in future with-
out meaningful transparency and greater consultation, having regard to voter
secrecy. Second, capacity building across all stakeholders, starting with, and led
by ECP (such as establishing a dedicated R&D cell within the ECP), to deliver
competent national ownership and informed policymaking. It seems likely that
escalation from pilots in bye-elections to full-scale use of internet voting for the
enormous Pakistani diaspora will happen in 2023. The issues highlighted in this
paper should receive urgent attention by all Pakistani stakeholders.
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